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David Millon* 
Shareholder Primacy in the Classroom After the 
Financial Crisis 
In the wake of the financial crisis, most corporate law reform efforts have 
focused on the interests of shareholders. Controversial proposals include proxy 
access, say on pay and other reforms aimed at excessive executive compensation, 
elimination of staggered boards, and regulation of hedge funds.1 Such proposals 
reflect the widely held assumption that the primary purpose of corporate activity — 
and therefore also the primary responsibility of corporate managers and the 
primary task for corporate law — is to maximize the shareholders’ returns on their 
investments.2 As a legal doctrine, this is, of course, known as the shareholder 
primacy principle. 
The assumption that shareholder primacy is a doctrine of corporate law is 
pervasive. Mainstream legal academics, often law-and-economics oriented, typically 
take this for granted.3 (This may be changing. Criticism of shareholder primacy 
from a policy perspective may be infiltrating faculties at leading law schools as 
concerns about short-termism draw increasing support outside the legal academy.4) 
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Business Law in a New Economic Environment at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting 
on August 3, 2012. 
 1. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111–203, § 951(a), 
(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (requiring shareholder vote on executive compensation under some 
circumstances). 
 2. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. 
L. 975, 977–79 (2006) (defining and describing the shareholder primacy principle). 
 3. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 419–21 (2002); ROBERT 
CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 17–19, 677–81 (1986); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of 
History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 440–41 (2001); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the 
Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON 
L. REV. 23, 23 (1991). 
 4. For concerns discussed outside the legal academy, see John C. Bogle, Restoring Faith in Financial 
Markets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2010, at A25 (“[T]he folly of short-term speculation has replaced the wisdom of 
long-term investing.”); Dominic Barton, Capitalism for the Long Term, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2011, at 85 
(criticizing “quarterly capitalism”); Francesco Guerrera, Welch Denounces Corporate Obsessions, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Mar. 13, 2009, at 1 (quoting General Electric’s former CEO, Jack Welch, as describing 
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Shareholder primacy is also a foundational dogma at the top business schools, as 
Khurana explains in his excellent book on the history of business education.5 The 
business press similarly takes shareholder primacy for granted,6 and it is commonly 
though not universally embraced by business leaders,7 investors, politicians, and 
government regulators. 
In fact, shareholder primacy is not a legal doctrine. Beyond the anomalous case 
of Dodge v. Ford,8 it is virtually impossible to find authority for it.9 Even so, 
shareholder primacy operates as a powerful social norm that generates significant 
social costs. It seems clear that one of the engines driving the reckless behavior that 
led to the financial crisis was the desire to enhance shareholder returns even if that 
meant pursuit of excessively risky investment strategies.10 More generally, it is 
widely recognized that many major corporations are fixated on quarterly earnings-
per-share, in large part because major institutional investors base their investment 
strategies on a short-term perspective. (There are a number of reasons for this.11 For 
example, public and private pension funds are desperate for cash to meet their own 
obligations to retirees, especially in an economic environment of reduced public 
and corporate contributions to pension plans. Similarly, mutual funds compete for 
investor dollars on the basis of annual and quarterly rather than longer-term 
performance.) Commitment to short-term shareholder value has significant 
negative implications for the long-term viability of large corporations, because it 
discourages investments in research and development,12 marketing, customer 
service, and other initiatives and projects that reduce current earnings and only 
 
“shareholder value [as] the dumbest idea in the world”). For examples of prominent academics critical of 
shareholder primacy, see LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST 
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the 
Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005). 
 5. See RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION (2007). 
 6. See, e.g., Aneel Karnani, The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2010, at 
R1 (“The movement for corporate social responsibility is in direct opposition . . . to the movement for better 
corporate governance, which demands that managers fulfill their fiduciary duty to act in the shareholders’ 
interest.”). 
 7. See, e.g., BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2012 at 30 (2012); Orit 
Gadiesh, Say It Loud, Say It Proud — ‘Shareholder Value!,’ WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2004, at B7 (citing a number of 
CEOs who identify shareholder value as a priority for their companies). 
 8. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is organized and 
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that 
end.”); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 301 
(“Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. was a highly unusual case.”). 
 9. See STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 4, at ch. 2. 
 10. See Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309 (2011) 
(explaining how excessive risk-taking in pursuit of short-term shareholder profits led to financial crisis).    
 11. See generally David Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 
2013). 
 12. Brian J. Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 73 
ACCOUNTING REV. 305 (1998). 
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generate pay-offs in the long run.13 For the same reasons, corporations are also less 
likely to invest in stakeholder well-being — such as employee training, improved 
working conditions, and cultivation of supplier and customer welfare — even 
though the company’s long-run sustainability may actually depend on such 
investments.14 
Given the widespread endorsement of the shareholder primacy idea in the 
academic and business arenas, it seems to me important that we law teachers do 
what we can to disabuse students of the assumption that corporate law requires that 
corporate activity prioritize shareholder interests. Many of them have heard this 
already and all of them are going to hear it once they get of law school if they are 
paying attention. One way to do this is to point out in the business organizations 
courses the fallacy of the view that shareholder primacy is a legal doctrine. 
At Washington and Lee we divide the basic business organizations course into 
two parts. The first is a three-credit Close Business Arrangements (CBA) course 
that covers agency, partnership, corporate law in the close corporation context, and 
LLCs. Virtually all our students enroll in this elective course. Publicly Held 
Businesses (PHB) is a three-credit follow-on course that is essentially an advanced 
course in Delaware corporate law. In addition to full coverage of fiduciary duties 
and derivative actions, it is also possible to cover in greater detail than usual 
mergers and acquisitions, hostile takeovers, preferred stock, corporate debt, 
valuation, and also federal law as it relates to voting and disclosure. 
The question of corporate purpose and shareholder primacy is less salient in 
CBA than it is in PHB. Because there is usually a strong degree of unity of 
ownership and control, those in charge of closely held firms are much less likely to 
possess the discretion or the inclination to deviate from profit maximization and, if 
they do, they do it with the consent of their fellow investors so there is typically no 
one to complain about it. Significant externalities (e.g., environmental or human 
rights costs) are less likely because of the generally smaller scale of closely held 
businesses. Even so, there are opportunities to interrogate the shareholder primacy 
assumption in the closely held context by introducing students to the benefit (or 
 
 13.  See Andrew G. Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, & Richard Davies, Economist 
Financial Stability Financial Institutions Division, Bank of England, The Short Long, Speech at the 29th Société 
Universitaire Européene de Recherches Financières Colloquium: New Paradigms in Money and Finance? 14 
(May 2011), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2011/ 
speech495.pdf (referring to short-termism as “a market failure . . . [that] would tend to result in investment 
being too low and in long-duration projects suffering disproportionately”); THE ASPEN INST. BUS. & SOCIETY 
PROGRAM, OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND 
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 2 (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/ 
files/content/docs/bsp/overcome_short_state0909.pdf (“[B]oards, managers, shareholders with varying 
agendas, and regulators, all, to one degree or another, have allowed short-term considerations to overwhelm the 
desirable long-term growth and sustainable profit objectives of the corporation.”). 
 14. See David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 523 (2011) 
(discussing importance of investment in stakeholder well-being for long-run corporate sustainability). 
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“B”) corporation alternative.15 It may also be useful to bring up constituency 
statutes16 and reforms like Oregon’s 2007 revision to its corporate statute 
authorizing corporations to include in their articles of incorporation a provision 
allowing or requiring management consideration of environmental and social 
values.17 Even if most small businesses are likely to focus on profit as the 
predominant objective, it would be good for students to understand that this is not 
a legal mandate. 
The shareholder primacy question is primarily a problem for publicly held 
corporations. I address it on day one in my PHB course and come back to it 
periodically throughout the semester. I do not spend a lot of time with the political 
or moral question of whether large corporations have an obligation to temper profit 
maximization with pursuit of conflicting objectives. Such discussions at this stage in 
the course tend to be uninformed and to devolve fairly quickly into little more than 
expressions of previously held political preferences. I do, though, want the students 
to see that the size and the scope of the operations of our largest corporations 
necessarily mean that there are substantial and potentially negative effects on the 
wider society in which they operate. I think the students also need to know that 
there is significant support abroad for the idea that large businesses have social 
responsibilities, even if that idea seems more marginal in this country. So I start the 
course by explaining the shareholder primacy conception of corporate purpose and 
management responsibility (Dodge v. Ford is a useful illustration of what can be at 
stake) and then contrast that conception with the idea of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) as a competing alternative that is taken seriously in many 
quarters around the world.18 I make no effort to resolve what is essentially a 
controversy over social policy or moral obligation, but I do want students to know 
that important choices about those questions are embedded in a commitment to 
shareholder primacy. 
While I do not try to convert students to my way of thinking about CSR, I do 
think it is very important that they understand that corporate law — this is 
supposed to a course about law, after all — is ambivalent on the question of 
shareholder primacy, generally agnostic, at best conflicted, and at times even 
hostile. (My colleague Christopher Bruner’s articles on this subject are important.19) 
There are several opportunities to point this out. For example, state statutes 
 
 15. See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 591 (2011). 
 16. See generally David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991).  
 17. OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047 (2007). 
 18. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle 
and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 101 (2008) (noting the competing theories in corporate law 
scholarship). 
 19. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 
1421 (2008) 
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authorize corporate philanthropy.20 Federal Rule 14a-8 allows shareholders to 
communicate with each other about the social, political, or ethical implications of 
what their firms are doing.21 The business judgment rule insulates from shareholder 
scrutiny management policies aimed at promoting nonshareholder interests as long 
as those policies can with at least minimal plausibility be said to further the long-
term interests of the corporate entity.22 Corporations confronted by hostile 
takeovers can take effects on nonshareholders into account in formulating defensive 
responses (except in the narrowly-defined and readily avoidable Revlon situation23). 
At the same time, even if the law does not require it, it does allow corporate 
management to disregard nonshareholder interests and pursue short-term profit 
maximization if it chooses to do so, as long as the corporation honors contracts and 
complies with applicable regulations. 
So corporate law ends up being irrelevant to the crucial question of corporate 
purpose and management’s responsibility, leaving them largely within the 
discretion of management itself. The students therefore need to understand that 
non-legal values and incentives — including political commitment, social norms, 
compensation arrangements, pressure from institutional shareholders, to name a 
few — can lead corporate management to prioritize current share price 
maximization over long-term strategic investment and cultivation of the well-being 
of key nonshareholder constituencies. Even if this approach does not produce 
another financial crisis, it has important implications for the future of our society. 
As corporate law teachers, our powers are limited but we can at least do our best to 
avoid perpetuating facile assumptions about shareholder primacy. 
 
 
 20. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (West 2012). 
 21. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (2011) (“shareholder proposal rule” allowing shareholders to 
communicate with each other by including proposals in management’s proxy solicitation materials under 
certain circumstances). 
 22. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30–.31 (2002); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 
1985) (clarifying that “the business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the 
managerial power granted to Delaware directors”). 
 23. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (stating that a 
corporation’s concern “for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is 
in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the 
highest bidder”). 
